On Preferentism

Part 1

Can a preferentist successfully respond to the objection from adaptive preferences, as outlined by Nussbaum?

This essay will evaluate Harriet Baber’s respond to the objection from adaptive preferences as outlined by Nussbaum, and will conclude that Baber, as a Preferentists, successfully responds to Nussbaum’s objection from adaptive preferences. In the first paragraphs, this essay, will give a brief background to the philosophical field that aims to find a framework for any action to be considered rational, where Preferentism is one of the suggested answers. Philosophers are divided on what it takes for an action to be considered rational, or irrational, in a strictly logical, non-moral, way. Rationally formed intention to act requires a rational held belief about how to bring about a rationally formed goal; and just like beliefs are based on evidence, goals are based on ideas about what is ‘genuinely’ valuable (Barber, 2014, p. 15). The Preferentists’ reply to that question is ‘whatever floats your boat’, and Nussbaum has some serious criticism about that.

Objectivists, on the other hand, come with a list for what is ‘objectively’ valuable, and they believe that the items in their list are valuable independently of our valuing them. Unfortunately, objectivists themselves don’t agree about what should be in that list (Barber, 2014, p. 45). This ambiguity about what is supposed to be valuable, independently of anyone valuing it, led the Preferentists to be very suspicious of any ‘objective’ list of final value; objective according to whom and why? Objective lists, by the principal of their substantive value, that objectivists believe they have in and of themselves, they deliberately do not consider people’s actual preferences. The danger of some group forcing as ‘final values’ upon others their own interest, in a paternalistic way, is obvious (Barber, 2014, p. 46).

Preferentists are sceptical about the possibility of universally ‘objective’ final values. They believe, as we saw in the first paragraph, that our own personal preferences can only determine whether something is valuable for us (Barber, 2014, p. 52). Preferentism gives space for individual and cultural differences. This gives Preferentism and advantage, because, as we mentioned in the above paragraph, Objectivism can be used by groups of people that can force their own interests as ‘objective’ final values.

The problem with Preferentism is that, since the only criterium for people's welfare is the satisfaction of their own preferences, it allows space for ‘quote unquote, deformed’ preferences (The Open University, 2014). To accept that people should be permitted to have even their self-destructive preferences met in order to achieve well-being, seems paradoxical, and no one advocates for this unfiltered form of Preferentism (Barber, 2014, p. 54). An even greater problem is that people’s preferences can be ‘manipulated, brainwashed, hypnotised or propagandised’ by others (The Open University, 2014). Thus, both, Preferentism and Objectivism, when used as a basis for political principles, can be used to manipulate people into valuing something that serves only someone else’s interests. Nussbaum believes that, additionally, Preferentism does not provide any framework for ‘a radical critique of unjust institutions’ (cited in Barber, 2014, p. 156).

Nussbaum is set to find a middle way, between Preferentism and Objectivism, that will solve the problems each theory faces, by keeping and rejecting aspects of both (Barber, 2014, p. 70). Her objection to Preferentism is a problem caused by what she calls adaptive preferences. She believes that ‘individuals adjust their desires to the way of life they know’ (Nussbaum, cited in Barber, 2014, p. 159). This phenomenon is called adaptive preferences and is not always a problem. It makes perfect sense for me to ‘adjust’ my preference to become a professional basketball player since my height is 1.62m and I am asthmatic. Jogging and yoga are probably more suitable for me, and it will be wise for me to adapt my preferences with the restrictions of my reality.

There are some special cases of adaptive preferences though, according to Nussbaum, that are ‘inappropriately adaptive’. Firstly, they ‘are induced by adverse conditions, and secondly, they’re such that the satisfaction of them is not conducive to one’s wellbeing’ (The Open University, 2014). Nussbaum believes that this can be used by unjust institutions to justify taking advantage of people who are so used to unfair treatment, that they have come to prefer the way things are (Nussbaum, cited in Barber, 2014, p. 156). Thus, government policies and other institutions should work towards readjusting these problematic adaptive preferences, with ‘consciousness-raising programs’ (Nussbaum, cited in Barber, 2014, p. 155). Nussbaum’s conjectures are based on her conversations with ‘disadvantaged’ people that she encountered in her travels (The Open University, 2014), and she is using examples of real people to make her point more vivid.

In one of Nussbaum’s examples, we meet Jayamma. Jayamma lived in India, in conditions of sexists’ discrimination at work, ‘paid less for heavier work.. and denied chances of promotion’; at home, her husband had spent all their money in ‘unthrifty’ ways, leaving all responsibilities of supporting their children and doing all the housework to Jayamma (Nussbaum, cited in Barber, 2014, p. 155). Yet, despite what Nussbaum expected, Jayamma did not complain at all about her condition. Nussbaum (on the same page) states that Jayamma seemed to lack any understanding of her situation being wrong, or even any sense of herself as someone with rights that can be violated. In another example, we meet Vasanti, a woman who, according to Nussbaum, also did not believe her husband’s abuse was a violation of her rights, since she believed it to be ‘a part of women’s lot’ (Nussbaum, cited in Baber, 2007, p. 113).

Nussbaum believes that, first, ‘there is something wrong with these preferences’, and secondly, that ‘many women all over the word still do have’ those deformed preferences. Her conclusion is that Preferentism forces us to say that since these women (Jayamma, Vasanti, and all these women all over the word that Nussbaum mentions) are not expecting anything better from their life, then that’s what they should get, nothing. This is Nussbaum’s objection from adaptive preferences. These disformed adaptive preferences, she states, ‘clash with universal norms... of basic nutrition and health’ and satisfying these obviously problematic preferences cannot possibly be the underpinning basis for political principles (Nussbaum, cited in Barber, 2014, p. 155).

Nussbaum’s middle way suggests that there must be a kind of a ‘list’ that we can all agree on, when creating policies, that should not be forced upon people, as an Objectivists would argue, but instead a list of ‘central human capabilities’ (Nussbaum, cited in Barber, 2014, p. 163). These ‘capabilities’ Nussbaum is eager to state, should not be seen as ‘paternalistic in any typical sense’, nevertheless she does see ‘intrinsic value’ in the items in her list (Nussbaum, cited in Barber, 2014, p. 162), and they are meant to correct the problem from adaptive preferences.

Harriet Baber criticises the allegedly non-paternalistic motives of Nussbaum. She does not deny the possibility of isolated cases of problematic adaptive preferences. The example she gives, in the audio recording with Alex Barber, is ‘the case of Stockholm syndrome, where victims of a bank robbery, that kept them hostages and lasted for 6 days, ‘became attached to their captors’ and preferred to promote their captors interests instead of their own (The Open University, 2014). Yet, that does not pose a challenge for Preferentism about welfare policies, Baber explains. In the same audio recording Baber points out a ‘very important empirical question about when it happens and how frequently’, and in her article for ‘Adaptive Preferences’ she is directly answering Nussbaum’s objection, arguing that the women in the examples Nussbaum is using to base her point, do not even have the preferences that she credits them with (Baber, 2007, p. 109).

In her response to Nussbaum’s objection, Baber points out that, in fact, neither Jayamma, nor Vasanti, are cases of adaptive preferences; they are just realistic, in very difficult situations, with very limited options (Baber, 2007, p. 114, 117). Thus, it is not their preferences that are distorted, and should be dealt with by policy makers, it is their prospects that should be improved (Baber, 2007, p. 118). Nussbaum, Baber believes, provides us with no real evidence that these women prefer the conditions they tolerate (Baber, 2007, p. 117). Nussbaum, Baber continues, confuses choices with preferences. Preferences are what would people choose if they had the choice to. In reality thought, despite what we would prefer, we have to make choices out of real options given to us. If my partner prefers the green-lit milk, yet one day he comes from the shop with a blue one, my first hypothesis would be that the shop was out of green ones, not that he changed his preferences. In the same way, these women do not suffer from distorted adaptive preferences, or low self-esteem, as Nussbaum claims, they are only ‘rationally playing the odds’ (Baber, 2007, p. 116).

The moral of the story of Jayamma, according to Baber, is that Jayamma’s lack of frustration and protest about her conditions should not be confused to be the same thing as ‘desire satisfaction’ (Baber, 2007, p. 116). We have no reason to believe that her preferences where distorted, since Nussbaum provides ‘no evidence to suggest that Jayamma would reject’ better conditions and better treatment if that was a realistic option for her (Baber, 2007, p. 111). Not only she provides not evidence for that, but Baber points out that Nussbaum herself notes that the women in her examples do jump in in every given opportunity to ‘participate in women’s co-ops’, and improve their conditions (The Open University, 2014).

In Nussbaum’s example of Vasanti (the woman who did not believe her husband’s abuse was a violation of her rights,) Baber points out that Vasanti did leave her husband at the end, when he took part in an ‘Indian government’s financial program for voluntary sterilization’ (Baber, 2007, p. 116). Baber sees that move of Vasanti not as a correction of her previously distorted preferences, but as a change in her condition; in the options she had available. In India, where Vasanti was playing the odds, when a marriage fails, the wife is blamed by her own family of origin for the failure of the marriage, and she is rejected. Unable to return to her paternal home, or her husband’s home, she would end up homeless, without any prospects of recovering from that situation.

Thus, we can make the conclusion that Vasanti quite rationally calculated that, given the options she has, it is better for her to keep up with the abuse, not because she preferred to be abused than not being abused, but because she preferred being abused with a home, than not being abused but also being homeless. Vasanti additionally had reasons to believe that her circumstances would improve once she had children from that marriage, since in her culture having children improves a woman’s status. Once that possibility vanished, with her husband’s vasectomy, she found the courage to leave her husband and return to her family (Baber, 2007, p. 116). The moral that Baber sees in Vasanti story is that options can come in pairs and bundles; ‘preferring a bundle that includes x to one that includes y is not the same thing as preferring x to y’ (Baber, 2007, p. 114).

Baber takes her response to Nussbaum’s objection from adaptive preferences as step farther than proving that the examples Nussbaum’s objection are based on are not really cases of adaptive preferences. She turns the criticism towards Nussbaum’s intentions for ‘rescuing’ these disadvantaged women from their own inappropriate, distorted, preferences, promoting polices that focus in providing self-esteem and dignity awareness to these women, to correct their distorted preferences, instead of putting that effort to provide them with material assistance and more options available to them. (Baber, 2007, p. 114). Baber worry is that self-esteem, dignity, and such are cheap ‘goods’ that do not really make a difference. Baber concludes that it is not the Preferentists ideas that we need to worry for the control of unjust institutions (The Open University, 2014). It is when the ‘privileged social reformers’ [that do not realise ‘how little room for manoeuvre most of us have’ (The Open University, 2014)], and they ‘fuss about providing less privileged people with these cheap ‘goods’, instead of making real changes, that we need to worry about (Baber, 2007, p. 118). This essay concludes that Baber does successfully respond to Nussbaum’s objection from adaptive preferences.

Part 2:

Objection from Adaptive Preferences Nussbaum Vs Preferentists

A brief introduction to the philosophical topic:

Rational actions: Rationally formed intention =

Rational held belief + Rationally formed goal,

(‘genuinely’ valuable).

What is valuable? According to whom and why?

Objectivism Vs Preferentism

Objectivism: Values are objective, in and of themselves; independently of our valuing them.

Objectivists do not agree about what should be in the list of ‘objective’ values.

Political danger of paternalistic enforced values; the chauvinism objection to Objectivism.

Preferentism: Personal preferences can only determine whether something is valuable for us.

Advantage of Preferentism: Space for individual and cultural differences.

Problem with Preferentism:

• People being manipulated and adapt to deformed preferences.

• Preferentism does not provide any framework for radical critique of unjust institutions.

Nussbaum is set to find a middle way.

Nussbaum’s Objection from Adaptive Preferences

• Some preferences are inappropriately adapted by adverse conditions. (Adaptive preferences are not always a problem.)

• Policy makers need to interfere.

• Preferentism offers no framework to judge unjust institutions.

Nussbaum believes that this can be used by unjust institutions,

to justify taking advantage of people who are so used to unfair treatment.

Nussbaum’s Alternative?

‘Consciousness-raising programs’,

In a non-paternalistic way, to readjust problematic adaptive preferences according to a

‘Central human capabilities’ list of ‘intrinsic’ values.

Nussbaum gives examples of disadvantage women’s real cases, that do not complain about their exploitation.

This is where Nussbaum bases her objection from adaptive preferences.

Harriet Baber’s respond:

• Questions the non-paternalistic motives of

Nussbaum & ‘privileged’ social reformers.

‘Rescuing’ these disadvantaged women from their own preferences, by promoting polices that focus in providing self-esteem and dignity awareness (cheap ‘goods’), instead of putting effort to provide them with material assistance & more options available to them.

• Adaptive preferences do not pose a challenge for Preferentism,

about welfare policies.

Women in Nussbaum’s examples:

Do not have their preferences being inappropriately adapted.

They just have limited options and try to make the best of their bad situation.

Options can come in pairs and bundles.

‘Preferring a bundle that includes x to one that includes y, is not the same thing as preferring x to y’.

Conclusion

Barber Vs Nussbaum:

• Barber showed that Nussbaum’s examples are not cases of adaptive preferences.

• They are cases of limited options.

• Barber argues that Preferentism provides a better framework (people’s own preferences) for a radical critique of unjust institutions.

Baber does successfully respond to

Nussbaum’s objection from adaptive preferences.

Bibliography

• Baber, H.E. (2007), ‘Adaptive Preference’, Social theory and practice, 33(1), pp. 105–126. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200733137.

• Barber, A., (2014), Reason in Action A333 Book 3, Milton Keynes, The Open University.

• Nussbaum, M.C. (2001), ‘Symposium on Amartya Sen’s philosophy: Adaptive preferences and women’s options’, Economics and Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 1, pp.67–88, cited in Barber, A., (2014), Reason in Action A333 Book 3, Milton Keynes, The Open University.

• The Open University, (2014), ‘Baber on welfarism and adaptive preferences (Part 1)’, [Audio recording], A333 Key Questions in Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/6e/9b/6e9b36a57e42f4056ebcb107f9edc4cff656c987?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b3_aud005a.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230212%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230212T215954Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21600&X-Amz-Signature=b62d4dd40cd8bd1413592e58c3ef6b90ee6f8a36f3e68cfb83b83b3f0a86b7b0 (Accessed 03 January 2023).

• The Open University, (2014), ‘Baber on welfarism and adaptive preferences (Part 2)’, [Audio recording], A333 Key Questions in Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/56/1f/561fe5a91586e8728bc1fa4e2d528222e3e38deb?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b3_aud005b.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230212%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230212T220112Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21600&X-Amz-Signature=3d35a7c473e8153466680599cdbcb8df083951e668bcebc6d62e9e0a7cac1caa (Accessed 03 January 2023).