Is killing an innocent person always wrong? Spoiler alert: Yes (Undergraduate philosophy essay about war)

I can't bring World Peace, but I can at least share my philosophy essay on why it is always wrong to kill innocent people even at war:

To answer, this essay will first narrow the question: ‘Is killing an innocent person always wrong?’, within the field of war. More specifically, it will examine the moral aspect—in contrast with the legal one (The Open University, 2014)—of the matter of the wrongness, and the arguments for potential permissibility, with regards to killing innocent people in war. Jon Pike points out that killing people is normally, we think, a very bad thing to do. Yet, once we start thinking about war, we find situations in which this very bad thing can be justified (The Open University, 2014). This essay will examine the main-known justifications for killing innocent people in war and will conclude that they all fail to justify the killing of the innocent.

There are three main philosophical approaches regarding the ethical standards of war. A lot of people see life as sacred (Belshaw, 2014, p. 7). Thus, not surprisingly, on one edge, there is the idea that all wars are unjust, because innocent people are killed in them, and we should not make war at all (Pike, 2014, p. 19). On the other side, there is the idea that war has nothing to do with ethics. War is something like a force of nature. As we would not wonder about the ethical standards of an earthquake, thus it makes no sense to question war about ethics. In fact, if we adopt a Pacifist view, Realists warn us, it would be ‘a dangerous mistake’ because we would risk more innocent people getting killed from the attacking side, without any army protecting them (Pike, 2014, p. 19).

The third approach—a middle way—is one that international laws have adopted for centuries. This is the Just War Tradition which has influenced the just war theory of our times. This is the acceptance of the necessity to be realistic about the existence of war, while we still try to keep some basic ethical standards in order to minimise the brutality and the consequences of war. Just war theory makes a clear distinction between who is and who is not liable to be killed during war. Combatants—on both sides—are liable to be killed; non-combatants have immunity from being liable to be killed (Pike, 2014, p. 11-2). We will examine the philosophical justifications of the violation of the non-combatant’s immunity, starting with the one that attempts to justify the intentional massive killings of innocent people, to the arguments that only allow unintentional killings of innocent people. Finally, we will examine the one-to-one scenario of a soldier encountering a soldier of the opposite side outside of battle.

The commonly accepted reason to override the rights of non-combatants is when ‘a nation state faces a serious and imminent threat to its existence’. Winston Churchill described that situation as Supreme Emergency (Pike, 2014, p. 171). In the World War II, 300,000 Germans were killed, and 780,000 injured by the allies. Most of them were civilians. Walzer uses utilitarian language when he observes that these numbers are still low, compared with the Nazi genocide (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 157). Walzer reveals that the purpose of the raids was explicitly declared to be the destruction of civilian morale. The target was the centre of a city.

Walzer acknowledges that the discrimination between combatants and non-combatants ‘does not distinguish Allied from enemy non-combatants, at least not with regard to the question of their murder’. Walzer warns us that ‘Supreme Emergency’ rationalisation might be misused by ‘frantic’ opportunists (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 155). Yet still, he believes that sometimes we are simply ‘forced to kill the innocent’. Nevertheless, Walzer doesn’t deny the dreadful possibility that the Bomber Command was simply used because ‘it was there’ (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 158). Walzer recognizes that ‘the supreme emergency passed long before the British bombing reached its crescendo’ (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 159).

Walzer denies utilitarian justification of cities bombing (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 160). However, in conditions of Supreme Emergency, Walzer seems to imply that we are allowed to let consequentialist ways of thinking overwrite innocent people’s human rights. These conditions, for Walzer, were met in the World War II, where the possibility of a Nazi ‘victory was both frightening and imminent’ (Pike, 2014, p. 101). Critics of Walzer have accused of replacing his supposedly rights-based theory with a utilitarian one (Statman, 2006, p. 59). Utilitarianism is the belief that it is worthy and morally permissible to sacrifice the life of one, regardless of their innocence, to save the lives of many. Daniel Statman believes that none of the situations within war—that Walzer suggests are ‘Special Permissions’—can withstand criticism (Statman, 2006, p. 60). There are three Special Permissions: first, a group faces the threat of massacre or enslavement; second, when all diplomatic and conventional military ways have failed to counter the threat; and last, that the overriding of the convention of not killing innocent people could ‘prevent the otherwise inevitable catastrophe (Statman, 2006, p. 59).

Statman disagrees with the critics of Walzer that have accused him of having utilitarian ideas. Statman points out that utilitarianism does indeed care more about numbers than individuals; but that is number of people regardless of their race, or ethnicity (Statman, 2006, p. 60).  In that sense, if a small group of people is threatened by extinction, it cannot claim utilitarian permission to kill not even one more than how many they are, since, if they just accept their fate and die, at least one less person will be dead. They could not justify nationalistic motives with the universality of utilitarianism. Even if we accept that a discrimination between citizens and non-citizens is morally accepted, still it is a big jump to assume this gives them the ‘right to kill non-citizens in order to preserve the lives of citizens (Statman, 2006, p. 61).

Furthermore, according to utilitarianism, if an action is right then it is not only permissible, it is mandatory. However, as expected, neither Walzer nor any other supporter of Special Permissions would accept such a conclusion of their theory. Not even the moderate deontologists, who could accept in extreme cases the killing of innocent people and children, would not give any permission to kill so many people to save just a small group of people (Statman, 2006, p. 61). We see that, Statman continues, neither utilitarianism nor moderate deontologists would accept any Special Permissions to any group that could justify the bombing of innocent people.

Statman’s argumentation shifts away the attention of criticism from attempts to understand Supreme Emergency with utilitarian, mandatory perspective. His first point is that the conditions that are meant to justify Supreme Emergency are caused by human beings, not by some force beyond reason and moral, like a natural catastrophe. His second point is that this humanely induced catastrophe, in Walzer’s account, does not even have to be as horrifying as the threat that Hitler represented, for a nation to justify Special Permissions (Statman, 2006, p. 61).  This takes us to Statman’s third observation. The ‘problematic’ actions, as he calls them, are taken towards the population that the source of threat are the members, not towards any third-party members. Statman concludes that all of that is more like the train of thought that justifies self-defence, not utilitarian calculations (Statman, 2006, p. 62).

Statman continues with a thorough examination of Special Permissions and Supreme Emergency. Statman is clear. The self-defence way of thinking Supreme Emergency also fails (Statman, 2006, p. 62). Self-defence, by definition, is towards an attacker. The non-combatants are not the threat. Next is the argument from minimal responsibility. It assumes permissibility of the intentional targeting of non-combatants by denying their innocence (Statman, 2006, p. 64). The members of the perpetrator state are surely preferred to die, if citizens of the defensive side can be saved that way. The civilians of the attacking group could be individually held responsible for allowing or even helping the unjust regime. This argument is stronger when they are members of a democratic nation. In totalitarian ones, it can still be argued that, in comparison to the just side’s non-combatants, they still hold some minimal responsibility. Even though the realistic power of individuals to change their political system is practically extremely limited. Nevertheless, as a group, they could resist their unjust dictators (Statman, 2006, p. 66).

Yet, it is still not at all clear how responsible a street cleaner was in the German cities that where deliberately bombed in World War II. Statman sees here a secret premise. The argument from minimal responsibility of that cleaner and his fellow non-combatant citizens ‘must assume some kind of collectivism (Statman, 2006, p. 67). Thus, they are assumed reliable to be killed under Supreme Emergency, based only on the fact of their being German, and not on any individual misbehaviour on their part (Statman, 2006, p. 68). Obviously, this argument cannot stand for their children, or for the ones that did not support the regime, foreigners, journalist, and foreign diplomats (Statman, 2006, p. 76).

Statman sees this objection as decisive, and indeed there seems to be no way around it. Even supported by the doctrine of double effect, for which we will talk later, Statman is clear. The argument from minimal responsibility fails. Jeff McMahan also finds completely unacceptable any group-based or identity-based criterion of liability to attack. He believes that only terrorists have these kind of views (The Open University, 2014). Additionally, McMahan warns institutions that the public enforcement of some morally justified laws, that nevertheless are not realistic, can have very negative effects.

Uwe Steinhoff’s strongest argument against the self-defence justification of Supreme Emergency is that the difference between an attacker and a defender is not only that the attacker started the attack, but that they can stop being a threat—thus being reliable to be killed—any time they want. This is exactly what makes them liable to be killed in self-defence (Steinhoff, 2008, p. 222). Yet, at the level of the individual, even the armed combatants cannot hope to personally stop, or escape, the war. ‘Innocent civilians are no less innocent when they are citizens of the country engaged in an unjust war. Accordingly, they are not liable to be attacked and killed. If they are, they are wronged’ (Steinhoff, 2008, p. 223).

Steinhoff demonstrates, with a long thought experiment about German cities’ bomber, how any attempt to justify the killing of innocent people, within the framework of self-defence, end up creating a potentially endless vicious circle of killings, and that each round of killings is sufficient to justify the next killings (Steinhoff, 2008, p. 224-5). Furthermore, critics have accused Walzer of having a pro-state bias, against the rights of the individual. Walzer answers affirmatively, ‘though not without hesitation and worry’, to the question of permissibility of soldiers and statesmen to ‘override the rights of innocent people for the sake of their own political community’. He even uses words as ‘the sense of obligation and of moral urgence’. Yet, to individuals, he only allows, in self-defence, to attack their attackers (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p.156).

C.A.J Coady questions the pro-state bias that the Palestinian resistance groups should be denied the right to use supreme emergency permissibility for their terrorist attacks against the Israelis. It is not clear what is the decisive difference between political communities and nations. Nevertheless, Walzer, without solving the problem of the lack of any argument that would support such distinction, argues that terrorist can never be justified or excused (Coady, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 162). Yet he allows states to employ terrorism in a tactical sense. Walzer refuses to admit that he is ascribing a kind of transcendence to communal life. Yet, he holds ‘the survival and freedom of political communities’ to be the ‘highest values of international society’.

Coady doubts the existence of any argument that could support the superiority of these values, over ‘family relationships, friendship, and moral integrity’.  Walzer still leaves an unjustified ‘gap between political communities and the state’ (Coady, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 163). Coady, concludes ‘that the attempt to resist the supreme emergency exemption to states is unpersuasive. Either it applies more generally, or it does not apply at all’. The Supreme Emergency story is a version of the ‘dirty hands tradition’. Coady suggests that the category of supreme emergency is ‘conceptually opaque’ (Coady, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 165).

Some believe intention is what makes the difference. This takes us to the exploration of the next argument that attempts to justify the killing of innocent people. The ‘doctrine of double effect is the idea that it’s permissible, sometimes, to bring about harm or evil as a side effect whilst you’re pursuing some proportionate good end’. Walzer suggests a modification of the doctrine of double effect. He emphasises the fact that the ‘evil’ consequences of the double effect is not enough to only not be intended. There has to be an additional attempt to minimize them (Pike, 2014, p. 81). Walzer adds this extra qualification to the doctrine of double effect.

For Walzer, there needs to be a ‘double intention’ of the bomber, not just a double effect of the bombing (Pike, 2014, p. 83). Thus, providing a proof—beyond the bomber’s questionable state of mind—that the intention only foresees the ‘evil’ and does not intend it. Sir Arthur Harris, Marshal of the Royal Force, c-in-c of wartime Bomber Command, insists that he was not aiming at civilians when he ordered the bombing German cities. On the contrary, his intention was the distraction of German army facilities (sited in The Open University, 2014).

Still, Helen Frowe sees it as a ‘troubled doctrine’. She finds very unplausible the idea that for a soldier who has been ordered to kill innocent people, looking to answer the question ‘is it morally wrong or not to drop that bomb?’, and that that is the decisive factor to judge whether he is allowed to kill innocent people to be his inner thoughts and personal motives. ‘The distinction between intending and foreseeing becomes overshadowed by the magnitude of the harm that you are causing’ (The Open University, 2014).

On one hand, Jon Pike sees the danger of adopting a Contingent Pacifist position, which allows the theoretical possibility of ethical permissibility of war in isolation from civilians’ location, where only combatants will face the risk of death (Pike, 2014, p. 165). If we refuse to accept Walzer’s Double Effect Doctrine, that provides a reconciliation between the supposed ‘absolute prohibition on killing civilians’ with the inevitable reality of fighting a war (Pike, 2014, p. 81). On the other hand, Pike is clear that doctrine of double effect can be ‘a bit too handy at providing excuses for acting wrongly’. The Double Effect Doctrine is still mostly based on the ‘distinction between intending and (merely) foreseeing’. These verbs, Pike insists, describe psychological states that make no difference to the external properties of the act of bombing innocent people, including children (Pike, 2014, p. 81).

Judith Jarvis Thomson provides a graphic illustration of what that idea would actually mean in real-life (war) conditions. Suppose, she says, a pilot, ordered to bomb a munitions factory that is located next to a school, comes to us with the sincere question of the ethical permissibility—or not—of such a bombing. The doctor of double effect suggests that the bomber is the only one that can answer that question. And, it depends entirely on the narrative they create in their head about their action. ‘What a queer performance this would be!’ Thomson exclaims (cited in Pike, 2014, p. 82).

David Mellow, makes a similar point. He believes there is a confusion there. An act can be morally wrong or permissible, regardless of the motives of the one acting. The motives judge the moral character of the person and not the act itself. These are two very different things and not at all dependent on each other. One can do the right thing for the wrong reasons. For example, one can stop someone from being murdered—a surly morally correct act—solely with the hope of getting a reward for it. This might indicate that the person has a flawed moral character, but it has nothing to do with the fact that the action of saving someone from being murdered is a ‘right’ thing to do (Mellow, cited in Pike, 2014, p. 29). The same distinction between wrong acts and wrong motives must apply if we do not want to end up with a conceptual asymmetry.

We have spoken so far about non-combatants being wronged when killed in war. Last, we will examine the permissibility of killing combatants that are not in a state of battle. Walzer sees the refusal to kill a naked soldier of the opposite side as ‘to fly in the face of military duty’ (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 145). Walzer sees it as less than is permitted’ to spare the naked soldier’s life. Walzer believe that all soldiers have lost immunity of the liability to be killed, when they joined the army and ‘allowed themselves’ to become dangerous men (Pike, (2014) p. 147).  Walzer says that the soldiers can—indeed should—be killed. However, Larry May criticises Walzer, pointing out that if he were true to his claims of not having a collectivists approach, he should admit such a view is incompatible, and would not leave any space for a naked soldier to be liable to be killed (May, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 148).

This counters the last argument on the potential moral permissibility of killing innocent people in war. This essay has spoken about Supreme Emergency, the Doctrine of Double effect, and the naked soldier dilemma, and this essay provided counter arguments on all of them. Thus, this essay’s conclusion to the question: ‘Is killing an innocent person always wrong?’ is yes, it is always wrong killing an innocent person.

Essay by Lotous Michalopoulou

(This was my final philosophy assignment. Today (7/7/2025), I got permission from the Open University to post it here.)

Bibliography

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Pike, J., (2014), War A333 Book 2, Milton Keynes, The Open University

Statman, D., (2006), ‘Supreme Emergency Revisited’, Ethics, vol. 117, no. 1, pp. 58-79

Steinhoff, U., (2006), ‘Debate: Jeff McMahan on the Moral Inequality of Combatants’, Journal of Political Philosophy: Vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 220-26

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Sketch by Maria Michalopoulou