I can't bring World Peace, but I can at least share my philosophy essay on why it is always wrong to kill innocent people even at war:
To answer, this essay will first narrow the question: ‘Is killing an innocent person always wrong?’, within the field of war. More specifically, it will examine the moral aspect—in contrast with the legal one (The Open University, 2014)—of the matter of the wrongness, and the arguments for potential permissibility, with regards to killing innocent people in war. Jon Pike points out that killing people is normally, we think, a very bad thing to do. Yet, once we start thinking about war, we find situations in which this very bad thing can be justified (The Open University, 2014). This essay will examine the main-known justifications for killing innocent people in war and will conclude that they all fail to justify the killing of the innocent.
There are three main philosophical approaches regarding the
ethical standards of war. A lot of people see life as sacred (Belshaw, 2014, p.
7). Thus, not surprisingly, on one edge, there is the idea that all wars are
unjust, because innocent people are killed in them, and we should not make war
at all (Pike, 2014, p. 19). On the other side, there is the idea that war has
nothing to do with ethics. War is something like a force of nature. As we would
not wonder about the ethical standards of an earthquake, thus it makes no sense
to question war about ethics. In fact, if we adopt a Pacifist view, Realists
warn us, it would be ‘a dangerous mistake’ because we would risk more innocent people
getting killed from the attacking side, without any army protecting them (Pike,
2014, p. 19).
The third approach—a middle way—is one that international
laws have adopted for centuries. This is the Just War Tradition which has
influenced the just war theory of our times. This is the acceptance of the
necessity to be realistic about the existence of war, while we still try to
keep some basic ethical standards in order to minimise the brutality and the
consequences of war. Just war theory makes a clear distinction between who is
and who is not liable to be killed during war. Combatants—on both sides—are
liable to be killed; non-combatants have immunity from being liable to be
killed (Pike, 2014, p. 11-2). We will examine the philosophical justifications
of the violation of the non-combatant’s immunity, starting with the one that
attempts to justify the intentional massive killings of innocent people, to the
arguments that only allow unintentional killings of innocent people. Finally,
we will examine the one-to-one scenario of a soldier encountering a soldier of
the opposite side outside of battle.
The commonly accepted reason to override the rights of
non-combatants is when ‘a nation state faces a serious and imminent threat to
its existence’. Winston Churchill described that situation as Supreme Emergency
(Pike, 2014, p. 171). In the World War II, 300,000 Germans were killed, and 780,000
injured by the allies. Most of them were civilians. Walzer uses utilitarian
language when he observes that these numbers are still low, compared with the
Nazi genocide (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 157). Walzer reveals that the
purpose of the raids was explicitly declared to be the destruction of civilian
morale. The target was the centre of a city.
Walzer acknowledges that the discrimination between
combatants and non-combatants ‘does not distinguish Allied from enemy
non-combatants, at least not with regard to the question of their murder’. Walzer
warns us that ‘Supreme Emergency’ rationalisation might be misused by ‘frantic’
opportunists (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 155). Yet still, he believes
that sometimes we are simply ‘forced to kill the innocent’. Nevertheless,
Walzer doesn’t deny the dreadful possibility that the Bomber Command was simply
used because ‘it was there’ (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 158). Walzer
recognizes that ‘the supreme emergency passed long before the British bombing
reached its crescendo’ (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 159).
Walzer denies utilitarian justification of cities bombing
(Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 160). However, in conditions of Supreme
Emergency, Walzer seems to imply that we are allowed to let consequentialist ways
of thinking overwrite innocent people’s human rights. These conditions, for Walzer,
were met in the World War II, where the possibility of a Nazi ‘victory was both
frightening and imminent’ (Pike, 2014, p. 101). Critics of Walzer have accused of
replacing his supposedly rights-based theory with a utilitarian one (Statman,
2006, p. 59). Utilitarianism is the belief that it is worthy and morally permissible
to sacrifice the life of one, regardless of their innocence, to save the lives
of many. Daniel Statman believes that none of the situations within war—that
Walzer suggests are ‘Special Permissions’—can withstand criticism (Statman,
2006, p. 60). There are three Special Permissions: first, a group faces the
threat of massacre or enslavement; second, when all diplomatic and conventional
military ways have failed to counter the threat; and last, that the overriding of
the convention of not killing innocent people could ‘prevent the otherwise
inevitable catastrophe (Statman, 2006, p. 59).
Statman disagrees with the critics of Walzer that have accused
him of having utilitarian ideas. Statman points out that utilitarianism does
indeed care more about numbers than individuals; but that is number of people regardless
of their race, or ethnicity (Statman, 2006, p. 60). In that sense, if a small group of people is
threatened by extinction, it cannot claim utilitarian permission to kill not
even one more than how many they are, since, if they just accept their fate and
die, at least one less person will be dead. They could not justify
nationalistic motives with the universality of utilitarianism. Even if we
accept that a discrimination between citizens and non-citizens is morally
accepted, still it is a big jump to assume this gives them the ‘right to kill
non-citizens in order to preserve the lives of citizens (Statman, 2006, p. 61).
Furthermore, according to utilitarianism, if an action is
right then it is not only permissible, it is mandatory. However, as expected,
neither Walzer nor any other supporter of Special Permissions would accept such
a conclusion of their theory. Not even the moderate deontologists, who could
accept in extreme cases the killing of innocent people and children, would not
give any permission to kill so many people to save just a small group of people
(Statman, 2006, p. 61). We see that, Statman continues, neither utilitarianism
nor moderate deontologists would accept any Special Permissions to any group that
could justify the bombing of innocent people.
Statman’s argumentation shifts away the attention of criticism
from attempts to understand Supreme Emergency with utilitarian, mandatory perspective.
His first point is that the conditions that are meant to justify Supreme
Emergency are caused by human beings, not by some force beyond reason and moral,
like a natural catastrophe. His second point is that this humanely induced
catastrophe, in Walzer’s account, does not even have to be as horrifying as the
threat that Hitler represented, for a nation to justify Special Permissions
(Statman, 2006, p. 61). This takes us to
Statman’s third observation. The ‘problematic’ actions, as he calls them, are
taken towards the population that the source of threat are the members, not
towards any third-party members. Statman concludes that all of that is more like
the train of thought that justifies self-defence, not utilitarian calculations
(Statman, 2006, p. 62).
Statman continues with a thorough examination of Special
Permissions and Supreme Emergency. Statman is clear. The self-defence way of
thinking Supreme Emergency also fails (Statman, 2006, p. 62). Self-defence, by
definition, is towards an attacker. The non-combatants are not the threat. Next
is the argument from minimal responsibility. It assumes permissibility of the intentional
targeting of non-combatants by denying their innocence (Statman, 2006, p. 64). The
members of the perpetrator state are surely preferred to die, if citizens of the
defensive side can be saved that way. The civilians of the attacking group could
be individually held responsible for allowing or even helping the unjust regime.
This argument is stronger when they are members of a democratic nation. In
totalitarian ones, it can still be argued that, in comparison to the just
side’s non-combatants, they still hold some minimal responsibility. Even though
the realistic power of individuals to change their political system is
practically extremely limited. Nevertheless, as a group, they could resist
their unjust dictators (Statman, 2006, p. 66).
Yet, it is still not at all clear how responsible a street
cleaner was in the German cities that where deliberately bombed in World War II.
Statman sees here a secret premise. The argument from minimal responsibility of
that cleaner and his fellow non-combatant citizens ‘must assume some kind of
collectivism (Statman, 2006, p. 67). Thus, they are assumed reliable to be
killed under Supreme Emergency, based only on the fact of their being German, and
not on any individual misbehaviour on their part (Statman, 2006, p. 68). Obviously,
this argument cannot stand for their children, or for the ones that did not
support the regime, foreigners, journalist, and foreign diplomats (Statman,
2006, p. 76).
Statman sees this objection as decisive, and indeed there seems
to be no way around it. Even supported by the doctrine of double effect, for
which we will talk later, Statman is clear. The argument from minimal
responsibility fails. Jeff McMahan also finds completely unacceptable any
group-based or identity-based criterion of liability to attack. He believes
that only terrorists have these kind of views (The Open University, 2014). Additionally,
McMahan warns institutions that the public enforcement of some morally
justified laws, that nevertheless are not realistic, can have very negative
effects.
Uwe Steinhoff’s strongest argument against the self-defence
justification of Supreme Emergency is that the difference between an attacker
and a defender is not only that the attacker started the attack, but that they
can stop being a threat—thus being reliable to be killed—any time they want.
This is exactly what makes them liable to be killed in self-defence (Steinhoff,
2008, p. 222). Yet, at the level of the individual, even the armed combatants cannot
hope to personally stop, or escape, the war. ‘Innocent civilians are no less
innocent when they are citizens of the country engaged in an unjust war. Accordingly,
they are not liable to be attacked and killed. If they are, they are wronged’
(Steinhoff, 2008, p. 223).
Steinhoff demonstrates, with a long thought experiment about
German cities’ bomber, how any attempt to justify the killing of innocent
people, within the framework of self-defence, end up creating a potentially
endless vicious circle of killings, and that each round of killings is
sufficient to justify the next killings (Steinhoff, 2008, p. 224-5). Furthermore,
critics have accused Walzer of having a pro-state bias, against the rights of
the individual. Walzer answers affirmatively, ‘though not without hesitation
and worry’, to the question of permissibility of soldiers and statesmen to
‘override the rights of innocent people for the sake of their own political
community’. He even uses words as ‘the sense of obligation and of moral
urgence’. Yet, to individuals, he only allows, in self-defence, to attack their
attackers (Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p.156).
C.A.J Coady questions the pro-state bias that the
Palestinian resistance groups should be denied the right to use supreme
emergency permissibility for their terrorist attacks against the Israelis. It
is not clear what is the decisive difference between political communities and
nations. Nevertheless, Walzer, without solving the problem of the lack of any
argument that would support such distinction, argues that terrorist can never
be justified or excused (Coady, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 162). Yet he allows
states to employ terrorism in a tactical sense. Walzer refuses to admit that he
is ascribing a kind of transcendence to communal life. Yet, he holds ‘the
survival and freedom of political communities’ to be the ‘highest values of
international society’.
Coady doubts the existence of any argument that could
support the superiority of these values, over ‘family relationships,
friendship, and moral integrity’. Walzer
still leaves an unjustified ‘gap between political communities and the state’
(Coady, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 163). Coady, concludes ‘that the attempt to
resist the supreme emergency exemption to states is unpersuasive. Either it
applies more generally, or it does not apply at all’. The Supreme Emergency
story is a version of the ‘dirty hands tradition’. Coady suggests that the
category of supreme emergency is ‘conceptually opaque’ (Coady, cited in Pike,
(2014) p. 165).
Some believe intention is what makes the difference. This
takes us to the exploration of the next argument that attempts to justify the
killing of innocent people. The ‘doctrine of double effect is the idea that
it’s permissible, sometimes, to bring about harm or evil as a side effect whilst
you’re pursuing some proportionate good end’. Walzer suggests a modification of
the doctrine of double effect. He emphasises the fact that the ‘evil’
consequences of the double effect is not enough to only not be intended. There has
to be an additional attempt to minimize them (Pike, 2014, p. 81). Walzer adds this
extra qualification to the doctrine of double effect.
For Walzer, there needs to be a ‘double intention’ of the
bomber, not just a double effect of the bombing (Pike, 2014, p. 83). Thus,
providing a proof—beyond the bomber’s questionable state of mind—that the
intention only foresees the ‘evil’ and does not intend it. Sir Arthur Harris,
Marshal of the Royal Force, c-in-c of wartime Bomber Command, insists that he
was not aiming at civilians when he ordered the bombing German cities. On the
contrary, his intention was the distraction of German army facilities (sited in
The Open University, 2014).
Still, Helen Frowe sees it as a ‘troubled doctrine’. She
finds very unplausible the idea that for a soldier who has been ordered to kill
innocent people, looking to answer the question ‘is it morally wrong or not to
drop that bomb?’, and that that is the decisive factor to judge whether he is
allowed to kill innocent people to be his inner thoughts and personal motives.
‘The distinction between intending and foreseeing becomes overshadowed by the magnitude
of the harm that you are causing’ (The Open University, 2014).
On one hand, Jon Pike sees the danger of adopting a
Contingent Pacifist position, which allows the theoretical possibility of
ethical permissibility of war in isolation from civilians’ location, where only
combatants will face the risk of death (Pike, 2014, p. 165). If we refuse to accept
Walzer’s Double Effect Doctrine, that provides a reconciliation between the
supposed ‘absolute prohibition on killing civilians’ with the inevitable
reality of fighting a war (Pike, 2014, p. 81). On the other hand, Pike is clear
that doctrine of double effect can be ‘a bit too handy at providing excuses for
acting wrongly’. The Double Effect Doctrine is still mostly based on the
‘distinction between intending and (merely) foreseeing’. These verbs, Pike insists,
describe psychological states that make no difference to the external
properties of the act of bombing innocent people, including children (Pike,
2014, p. 81).
Judith Jarvis Thomson provides a graphic illustration of
what that idea would actually mean in real-life (war) conditions. Suppose, she
says, a pilot, ordered to bomb a munitions factory that is located next to a
school, comes to us with the sincere question of the ethical permissibility—or
not—of such a bombing. The doctor of double effect suggests that the bomber is
the only one that can answer that question. And, it depends entirely on the
narrative they create in their head about their action. ‘What a queer
performance this would be!’ Thomson exclaims (cited in Pike, 2014, p. 82).
David Mellow, makes a similar point. He believes there is a
confusion there. An act can be morally wrong or permissible, regardless of the
motives of the one acting. The motives judge the moral character of the person
and not the act itself. These are two very different things and not at all
dependent on each other. One can do the right thing for the wrong reasons. For
example, one can stop someone from being murdered—a surly morally correct
act—solely with the hope of getting a reward for it. This might indicate that
the person has a flawed moral character, but it has nothing to do with the fact
that the action of saving someone from being murdered is a ‘right’ thing to do
(Mellow, cited in Pike, 2014, p. 29). The same distinction between wrong acts
and wrong motives must apply if we do not want to end up with a conceptual
asymmetry.
We have spoken so far about non-combatants being wronged
when killed in war. Last, we will examine the permissibility of killing
combatants that are not in a state of battle. Walzer sees the refusal to kill a
naked soldier of the opposite side as ‘to fly in the face of military duty’
(Walzer, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 145). Walzer sees it as less than is
permitted’ to spare the naked soldier’s life. Walzer believe that all soldiers have
lost immunity of the liability to be killed, when they joined the army and
‘allowed themselves’ to become dangerous men (Pike, (2014) p. 147). Walzer says that the soldiers can—indeed
should—be killed. However, Larry May criticises Walzer, pointing out that if he
were true to his claims of not having a collectivists approach, he should admit
such a view is incompatible, and would not leave any space for a naked soldier to
be liable to be killed (May, cited in Pike, (2014) p. 148).
This counters the last argument on the potential moral permissibility of killing innocent people in war. This essay has spoken about Supreme Emergency, the Doctrine of Double effect, and the naked soldier dilemma, and this essay provided counter arguments on all of them. Thus, this essay’s conclusion to the question: ‘Is killing an innocent person always wrong?’ is yes, it is always wrong killing an innocent person.
Essay by Lotous Michalopoulou
Bibliography
Belshaw, Ch., (2014), The Value of Life Book 4,
Milton Keynes, The Open University
Pike, J., (2014), War A333 Book 2, Milton Keynes, The
Open University
Statman, D., (2006), ‘Supreme Emergency Revisited’, Ethics, vol.
117, no. 1, pp. 58-79
Steinhoff, U., (2006), ‘Debate: Jeff McMahan on the Moral
Inequality of Combatants’, Journal of Political Philosophy: Vol. 16, no. 2, pp.
220-26
The Open University,
(2014), “‘Bomber’ Harris and Frowe on non-combatant immunity”. Key Questions in
Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/c5/5d/c55d19a70a48d0bf1716ed8d8bce86041d9c2a3d?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b2_aud001.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230522%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230522T151254Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21546&X-Amz-Signature=1b471d4e37abc1d9ca7baee59111b7e341ce54331c66f08e818ebde0a30da75b
(Accessed 11 May 2023)
The Open University,
(2014), ‘Frowe on non-combatant immunity’. Key Questions in Philosophy.
Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/b7/e2/b7e25768c361f67b3de1265a95d1812a239646ac?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b2_aud010.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230522%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230522T151557Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21543&X-Amz-Signature=95b90873671da4b7dbaf4cc4dc06acf889fc171a71b02232f167e6630947341d
(Accessed 11 May 2023)
The Open University,
(2014), ‘Frowe on the doctrine of double effect’. Key Questions in Philosophy.
Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/1d/a3/1da36a6be0fa4ed459412ce5c0d2e4eaf7f3d3cf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b2_aud011.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230522%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230522T151806Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21594&X-Amz-Signature=466fc666fd1c46ac48bf83377b2a88400f45e0e035bde14dc1bf59fb66c099e6
(Accessed 11 May 2023)
The Open University,
(2014), ‘Frowe on the ticking time bomb hypothesis’. Key Questions in
Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/51/bb/51bb5bea124c0414f7e2ade3057d7da140998b17?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b2_aud013.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230522%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230522T151706Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21594&X-Amz-Signature=6fa1745111917a5e805db36fd11dedf3b9bb7f2a235bf77eea3c460af23f8a7f
(Accessed 11 May 2023)
The Open University,
(2014), ‘How to think about war: tips from the experts’. Key Questions in
Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/a7/58/a758b3584a8d42b0a3104a45793a6e92b7251252?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b2_aud006.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230522%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230522T151927Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21573&X-Amz-Signature=9a16fccf7259b3d7ae49038487f9d25d5dc9fc4cb90d56a67d2fb92535b6c6fc
(Accessed 11 May 2023)
The Open University,
(2014), ‘Lazar and McMahan on the morality and rules of war’. Key Questions in
Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2live-s3bucket.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/02/57/02574aaa58e0ff22eb687b70b49984ff2a835c7e?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22a333_2014j_b2_aud012.mp3%22&response-content-type=audio%2Fmp3&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4IEL74JPEDP2AZKT%2F20230522%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230522T152030Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21570&X-Amz-Signature=1b4e17b173f53d8cd4717e4bbe3d7dbb4be2c59f2d83e1444ab95b7aced71722
(Accessed 11 May 2023)
No comments:
Post a Comment