Philosophy on the meaning of life

This essay is investigating the philosophical answer to the question: ‘is life meaningful?’ by clarifying the key terms of the question (life and meaning) and giving an overview analysis of the different philosophical approaches to the subject. The conclusion of this essay is that even if we cannot prove life to be meaningful in a global level, or intrinsically meaningful in a personal level, nevertheless, human life has the potential of being meaningful. Thus, the answer to the question ‘is life meaningful?’ is not a straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Meaning is ‘something that comes in degrees, and varies between lives’ (Belshaw, 2014, p. 136). We cannot assume the same levels of value to a life of a surgeon with that of a serial killer (Belshaw, 2014, p. 33). Meaning is not a given in life, but something to be created consciously, and individually.

For the first step to answer the question ‘is life meaningful?’ we must define what we mean by ‘life’, and what we mean by ‘meaningful’. We must clarify what kind of lives we are talking about. We must also establish who can be the judge of (and according to what criteria) of what we should consider (and what not) to be meaningful. In defining the ‘life’ part of the question, this essay is concerned only with human lives, and not those of animals, or plants. Belshaw (2014, p. 135) believes that these (human lives) are the kind of lives that the question of meaning makes sense to be asked, precisely because these sorts of lives can fail to have, or can lose, their meaning; they can become meaningless. We see here the indication of an objective blacklist of values, a point to which we will return later.

Meaning regarding human lives can be explored both in global and in local level. As we will see, those two levels of meaning do not depend on each other, as one would expect, and do not influence each other. In the global level we do not find answers of any help to the personal level of the question of meaning. If the quest for meaning in global level is leading us to be forced in accepting the necessary meaninglessness of the Cosmos as a whole, that it ‘is not aiming at anything’ (the belief that there is no point to the creation of the universe and humanity’s existence is completely purposelessly), this is irrelevant to the quest of meaning regarding individual lives (Belshaw, 2014, p. 154).

Assuming that the notion of purpose in life in a global level is necessarily non-existent, that would not mean that meaning in a personal life is also necessarily non-existent. The conception that global and local (personal) meaning is related and dependent on one another would be a fallacy of division, as Belshaw points out (2014, p. 155). We can see that clearer in the hypothetical case that has the quest for global meaning going the other way.

On the assumption that it turns out there is an aim, a reason, for the universe to exist, for example that there is a God, and he (or she, or they) has a plan for humankind. A plan that was already in place before time immemorial. A plan that gives meaning to the entirety of history. Not only that, but let us take that idea farther, and assume that specifically your own life has a very special purpose to fulfil within that grand divine plan. In that case one might conclude that your life cannot possibly be meaningless. Your life, in that divine plan scenario, must surely be full of meaning. That is though only regarding the ‘global divine plot’ kind of meaningful. Such a scenario would not make life meaningful for you personally. Being used as an instrument in someone else’s plan, human or God, does not provide any personal answers of meaning to anyone.

So, the question remains. The fact that our lives might have an instrumental purpose in a global plan will not help anyone to find meaning in life, in a personal level. One could argue that having a ‘meaningful’ life, as an instrument in a master plan, is not much different than the life of a turkey being raised to end up becoming the main dish in Christmas dinner (Belshaw, 2014, p. 137). Christianity does not hide that fact of God’s divine plan for us. Jesus said to his disciples (Luke 9:23) ‘If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me’. This personal aspect of the question is the one that affects all of us on a daily basis. We still need to find reasons to get up in the morning (Belshaw, 2014, p. 137). If we exist only for the purpose of recreation, for example, this is a circular kind of goal; one that does not have any final value. The meaning in life cannot possibly be to make more life. That being the case, we will now focus on the local, the personal, aspect of the question.

The personal level in the quest for meaning in life leads us to the second term we need to define. The ‘meaningful’ part of the question is much more complicated to be defined than the ‘life’ component of it. Philosophers are divided about that subject into two main categories, with variations that are trying to combine both edges of the spectrum. These philosophical differences are dividing philosophers regarding plenty philosophical topics. The underlining question about ‘meaningful’, as mentioned in the introduction, is who should be authorised to judge for, and according to which criteria, what is and what is not meaningful. The question can be rephrased as: can someone decide for themselves, using their own subjective criteria, or there is in fact an objective list of final values that is independent of what that someone, or anyone else for that matter, thinks?

In one side of the philosophical spectrum, we have the objectivists. They believe that there are ‘objective realities beyond ourselves’ (Cottingham, cited in Belshaw, 2003, p. 193). Cottingham believes that, as we see with Shakespeare’s Macbeth character, this list is related with morality rules, and cannot be arbitrary (Cottingham, cited in Belshaw, 2003, p. 194). According to Cottingham, a meaningful life does not come passively though. To find meaning in life we need to add to it his idea of Praxis; the keeping of religious rituals without necessarily the belief in the religious doctrines. Religious praxis for the sake of tricking ourselves into believing into the meaning of them, and thus get a sense of meaning for our own lives. ‘Fake it till you make it’. Even if someone manages to get a sense of meaning this way, it does not feel ‘intellectually respectable’ to stop our philosophical quest for meaning in one based in ‘false belief’ (Belshaw, 2014, p. 164).

An objective list of values to provide meaning is diametrically opposed to the idea that has meaning to be subjective; a personal matter for each to decide for themselves (Belshaw, 2014, p. 142). On this other side of the spectrum, we have the preferentists. Some students from the University of Cumbria, in a conversation with Christopher Belshaw, take this view as far as to argue that if someone finds meaning by spending their lives counting ‘by hand, the blades of grass in New York’s Central Park’ (Belshaw, 2014, p. 144), who are we to judge against their view about their own lives (The Open University, 2014). They are the only ones that have a saying to what is and what is not meaningful to them.

Objectivists would argue that meaning is not like pleasure; a personal matter for each of us to judge for ourselves. Rather, meaning is like success. Someone can announce that they take pleasure from something, and no one can question their judgment on that. On the other hand, no one can just announce their own success. Success that is not recognised by anyone else is not success, it is only the illusion of success.

Wolf takes a middle way. She agrees with Cottingham in that what gives meaning to a life cannot be subjective. It should be ‘worthy of love’, as she puts it (Wolf, in Belshaw, 2007, p. 183). However, she also involves subjective elements in her theory, believing that ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction meats objective attractiveness’ (Wolf, in Belshaw, 2007, p. 183-4). For Wolf though, meaning cannot arise by passive recognition of the value of the object of attraction. There needs to be a relationship of love with it for the meaning to arise. Wolf, and all objectivists, belief that there is the possibility of someone falsely believing that their life is meaningful, when in fact it is not. They believe someone can waste their lives despite what they themselves believe about it (Belshaw, 2007, p. 144).

The belief that meaning is not an inherent good in life, but something to be actively created, is mostly behind the preferentists. The idea that ‘we are free to create our own meaning’ (Belshaw, 2007, p. 139) implies that we do ought to actively create it, if it is indeed something we care about. Above, we mentioned the existence of a blacklist that is implied by philosophers, objectivists and preferentists alike. Objectivists are expected to have a blacklist of values, or at least values that are not in their list of ‘final values’ (Barber, 2014, p. 194). Yet, it seems that preferentists, even if they deny any list of final values, they still accept the existence of a blacklist of values, by accepting that there is such a thing as ‘rogue’ preferences that needs to be filtered out of the available places for meaning to be searched (Barber, 2014, p. 54).

Something worth mentioning here is that, historically speaking, the notion of meaning in life is not something people contemplated much about. In fact, Fraud believed that to question the meaning and the value of life is a sign of mental illness (Belshaw, 2007, p. 166). Some believe there is no meaning in life at all. Bernard Williams has written a paper that argues about the meaninglessness of life and takes it so far as to suggest that not only there is not meaning in life, but, since that is the case, ‘one might as well die earlier than later’ (Williams, 2010, Cambridge University Press). Duncan Pritchard writes on the subject that ‘absurdism looks unavoidable’ (Pritchard, 2010, p. 5).

Despite how unavoidable absurdism might look like, and despite our inability to proof the existence, or even the importance, of a global meaning, there seems to be no reason to deny the possibility of a meaningful life. Even if life is not meaningful by itself, humans have the potential of feeling their lives with meaning and with stories and relationships that we would be inhuman to question the meaningfulness in them. ‘The preciousness of individuals who are vulnerable, mortal, and yet somehow of eternal value, since their human lot of fragility and suffering has the capacity to deepen their understanding and sympathy’ (Cottingham, cited in Belshaw, 2003, p. 194).

In conclusion, this essay, in the search of meaning in human lives, separated the potential of meaning in global and in a local, personal, level. It then established that there can be no connection between them, and then focused in the pursue for meaning in the level of the individual. Next, it was examined who could be the one to judge if there is meaning or not in a particular life. Philosophers are divided into the ones that believe there is an objective beyond us list, that we need to use to make such conclusion. Preferentists believe it is a personal matter for the individual to decide. Then the existence of a blacklist of values that both objectivists and preferentists accept was suggested. At the end, this essay concludes that, even if there is no global meaning, and despite the threat of absurdity, there is no good reason why we can deny ourselves the potential of a meaningful life.

Bibliography:

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